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Abstract
We consider the following problem in which a given number of items has to be chosen from a predefined
set. Each item is described by a vector of attributes and for each attribute there is a desired distribution that
the selected set should have. We look for a set that fits as much as possible the desired distributions on
all attributes. Examples of applications include choosing members of a representative committee, where
candidates are described by attributes such as sex, age and profession, and where we look for a committee
that for each attribute offers a certain representation, i.e., a single committee that contains a certain number
of young and old people, certain number of men and women, certain number of people with different
professions, etc. With a single attribute the problem collapses to the apportionment problem for party-
list proportional representation systems (in such case the value of the single attribute would be a political
affiliation of a candidate). We study the properties of the associated subset selection rules, as well as their
computation complexity.
1 Introduction
A research department has to choose k members for a recruiting committee. A selected committee should
be gender balanced, ideally containing 50% of male and 50% of female. Additionally, a committee should
represent different research areas in certain proportions: ideally it should contain 55% of researchers special-
izing in area A, 25% of experts in area B, and 20% in area C. Another requirement is that the committee
should contain 30% junior and 70% senior researchers, and finally, the repartition between local and external
members should be kept in proportions 30% to 70 %. The pool of possible members is the following:
Name Sex Group Age Affiliation
Ann F A J L
Bob M A J E
Charlie M A S L
Donna F B S E
Ernest M A S L
George M A S E
Helena F B S E
John M B J E
Kevin M C J E
Laura F C J L
In the given example, if the department wants to select k = 3 members, then it is easy to see that there
exists no such committee that would ideally satisfy all the criteria. Nevertheless, some committees are better
than others: intuitively we feel the sex ratio should be either equal to 2:1 or to 1:2, the area ratio should be
equal to 2:1:0, the age ratio to 1:2, and the affiliation ratio to 1:2. Such relaxed criteria can be achieved by
selecting Ann, Donna, and George. Now, let us consider the above example for the case when k = 4. In such
case, the ideal sex ratio should be equal to 2:2, the research area ratio to 2:1:1, the age ratio to 1:3, and the
1
affiliation ratio to 1:3. It can be proved, however, that for k = 4 there exists no committee satisfying such
relaxed criteria. Intuitively, in such case the best committee is either {Ann, Charlie, Donna, George}, with
two externals instead of three, or {Charles, Donna, George, Kevin}, with males being over-represented.
In this paper we formalize the intuition given in the above example and define what it means for a com-
mittee to be optimal. When looking for an appropriate definition we follow an axiomatic approach. First, we
notice that our model generalizes the apportionment problem for proportional representation [2]. The central
question of the apportionment problem is how to distribute parliament seats between political parties, given
the numbers of votes casted for each party. Indeed, we can consider our multi-attribute problem, with the
single attribute being a political affiliation of a candidate, and the desired distributions being the proportions
of votes casted for different parties. In such case we can see that selecting a committee in our multi-attribute
proportional representation system boils down to selecting a parliament according to some apportionment
method.
There is a variety of apportionment methods studied in the literature [1]. In this paper we do not review
these methods in detail (we refer the reader to the survey of Balinski and Young [2]), but we rather focus
on a specific set of their properties that have been analyzed, namely non-reversal, exactness and respect of
quota, population monotonicity, and house monotonicity. We define the analogs of these properties for the
multi-attribute domain, and analyze our definition of an optimal committee for a multi-attribute domain with
respect to these properties.
To emphasize the analogy between our model and the apportionment methods, we should provide some
discussion on where the desired proportions for attributes come from. Typically, but not always, they come
from votes. For instance, each voter might give her preferred value for each attribute, and the ideal proportions
coincide with the observed frequencies. For instance, out of 20 voters, 10 would have voted for a male and
10 for a female, 13 for a young person and 7 for a senior one, etc. It is worth mentioning that the voters
might cast approval ballots, that is for each attribute they might define a set of approved values rather than
pointing out the single most preferred one. On the other hand, sometimes, instead of votes, there are “global”
preferences on the composition of the committee, expressed directly by the group, imposed by law, or by
other constraints that should be respected as much as possible independently of voter preferences.
The multi-attribute case, however, is also substantially different from the single-attribute one. In particu-
lar, multi-attribute proportional representation systems exhibit computational problems that do not appear in
the single-attribute setting. Indeed, in the second part of our paper we show that finding an optimal committee
is often NP-hard. However, we show that this challenge can be addressed by designing efficient approxima-
tion and fixed-parameter tractable algorithms.
After positioning our work with respect to related areas in Section 2, we present our model in Section 3.
In Sections 4 and 5 we discuss relevant properties of methods for multi-attribute fair representation. In
Section 6 we show that, although the computational of optimal committees is generally NP-hard, there exist
good approximation and fixed-parameter tractable algorithms for finding them. In Section 7 we point to
further research issues.
2 Related work
Our model is related to three distinct research areas:
Voting on multi-attribute domains (see the work of Lang and Xia [13] for a survey). There, the aim is to
output a single winning combination of attributes (e.g., in multiple referenda, a combination of binary values).
Our model in case when k = 1 can be viewed as a voting problem on a constrained multi-attribute domain
(constrained because not all combinations are feasible).
Multiwinner (or committee) elections. In particular, our model is related to the problem of finding a fully
proportional representation [6, 18]. There, the voters vote directly for candidates and do not consider at-
tributes that characterize them. Thus, in this literature, the term “proportional representation” has a different
meaning: these methods are ‘representative’ because each voter feels represented by some member of the
elected committee. The computational aspects of full proportional and its extensions have raised a lot of
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attention lately [21, 3, 7, 24, 17]. Our study of the properties of multi-attribute proportional representation is
close in spirit to the work of Elkind et al. [10], who gives a normative study of multiwinner election rules.
Budgeted social choice [16] is technically close to committee elections, but it has a different motivation: the
aim is to make a collective choice about a set of objects to be consumed by the group (perhaps, subject to
some constraints) rather than about the set of candidates to represent voters.
Apportionment for party-list representation systems (see the work of Balinski and Young [2] for a sur-
vey). As we already pointed out, the apportionment methods correspond to the restriction of our model to a
single attribute (albeit with a different motivation). While voting on multi-attribute domains and multiwinner
elections have lead to significant research effort in computational social choice, this is less the case for party-
list representation systems. Ding and Lin [8] studied a game-theoretic model for a party-list proportional
representation system under specific assumptions, and show that computing the Nash equilibria of the game
is hard. Also related is the computation of bi-apportionment (assignment of seats to parties within regions),
investigated in a few recent papers [22, 23, 14].
Constrained approval voting (CAP) [4, 20] is probably the closest work to our setting (MAPR). In CAP
there are also multiple attributes, candidates are represented by tuples of attribute values, there is a target
composition of the committee and we try to find a committee close to this target. However, there are also
substantial differences between MAPR and CAP. First, in CAP, the target composition of the committee,
exogenously defined, consists of a target number of seats for each combination of attributes (called a cell),
that is, for each ~z ∈ D1× . . .×Dp, we have a value s(~z); while in MAPR we have a smaller input consisting
of a target number for each value of each attribute. Note that the input in CAP is exponentially large in
the number of attributes, which makes it infeasible in practice as soon as this number exceeds a few units
(probably CAP was designed only for very small numbers of attributes, such as 2 or 3). Second, in CAP,
the selection criterion of an optimal committee is made in two consecutive steps: first a set of admissible
committees is defined, and the choice between these admissible committees is made by using approval ballots,
and the chosen committee is the admissible committee maximizing the sum, over all voters, of the number of
candidates approved (there is no loss function to minimize as in MAPR). A simple translation of CAP into
an integer linear programming problem is given in [20, 25].
3 The model
Let X = {X1, . . . , Xp} be a set of p attributes, each with a finite domain Di = {x1i , . . . , x
qi
i }. We say
that Xi is binary if |Di| = 2. We let D = D1 × . . . × Dp. Let C = {c1, . . . , cm} be a set of candidates,
also referred to as the candidate database. Each candidate ci is represented as a vector of attribute values
(X1(ci), . . . , Xp(ci)) ∈ D.
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For each i ≤ p, by πi we denote a target distribution πi = (π1i , . . . , π
qi
i ) with
∑qi
i=1 π
j
i = 1. We set
π = (π1, . . . , πp). Typically, n voters have casted a ballot expressing their preferred value on every attribute
Xi, and πji is the fraction of voters who have x
j
i as their preferred value for Xi, but the results presented in
the paper are independent from where the values πji come from (see the discussion in the Introduction).
The goal is to select a committee2 of k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} candidates (or items) such that the distribution
of attribute values is as close as possible to π. Formally, let Sk(C) denote the set of all subsets of C of
cardinality k. Given A ∈ Sk(C), the representation vector for A is defined as r(A) = (r1(A), . . . , rp(A)),
where ri(A) = (rji (A)|1 ≤ j ≤ qi) for each i = 1, . . . , p, and r
j
i (A) =
|{c∈A:Xi(c)=x
j
i
}|
k .
Definition 1 A committee A ∈ Sk(C) is perfect for π if ri(A) = πi for all i.
1By writing Xj(ci), we slightly abuse notation, that is, we consider Xj both as an attribute name and as a function that maps any
candidate to an attribute value; this will not lead to any ambiguity.
2We will stick to the terminology “committee” although the meaning of subsets of candidates has sometimes nothing to do with the
election of a committee.
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Thus, a perfect committee matches exactly the target distribution. Clearly, there is no perfect committee if
for some i, j, πji is not an integer multiplicity of 1k . In some of our results we will focus on target distributions
such that for each i, j the value kπji is an integer. We will refer to such target distributions as to natural
distributions.
We define metrics measuring how well a committee fits a target distribution, called loss functions.
Definition 2 A loss function f maps π and r to f(π, r(A)) ∈ R, and satisfies f(π, r(A)) = 0 if and only if
π = r.
There are a number of loss functions that can be considered. As often, the most classical loss functions
use Lp norms, with the most classical examples of L1, L2, and L∞. We focus on two representative Lp
norms, L1, and L∞, but we believe that other choices are also justified and may lead to interesting variants
of our model. Consequently, we consider the following loss functions:
• ‖ · ‖1 : ‖π, r(A)‖1 =
∑
i,j |r
j
i (A)− π
j
i |.
• ‖ · ‖1,max : ‖π, r(A)‖1,max =
∑
imaxj |r
j
i (A) − π
j
i |.
• ‖ · ‖max : ‖π, r(A)‖max = maxi,j |π
j
i − r
j
i (A)|.
Now, we are ready to formally define the central problem addressed in the paper.
Definition 3 (OPTIMALREPRESENTATION) Given X , C, π, k, and a loss function f , find a committee
A ∈ Sk(C) minimizing f(π, r(A)).
Example 1 For the example of the Introduction, we have X = {sex, group, age, affiliation}, D = {F,M}×
{A,B,C}×{J, S}×{L,E}, andX1(Ann) = F , X1(Bob) = M etc. {Charlie,Donna,George,Kevin} is
optimal for ‖ · ‖1, with ‖π, r(A)‖1 = 0.5+ 0.1+ 0.1+ 0.1 = 0.8, and for ‖ · ‖1,max, with ‖π, r(A)‖1,max =
0.4, but not for ‖ · ‖max. {Ann,Charlie,Donna,George} is optimal for ‖ · ‖max, with ‖π, r(A)‖max =
max(0, 0.2, 0.05, 0.2) = 0.2, but not for the other criteria.
4 The single-attribute case
In this section we focus on the single-attribute case (p = 1). Without loss of generality, let us assume that
the single attribute be party affiliation. Further, let us for a moment assume that for each value xj1 there are
at least k candidates with value xj1 (this is typically the case in party-list elections). Then finding the optimal
committee comes down to apportionment problem for party-list elections, where a fractional distribution π1
has to be “rounded up” to an integer-valued distribution r1 such that
∑
j r
j
1 = k.
There are two main families of apportionment methods: largest remainders and highest average methods
[2]. We shall not discuss highest average methods here, because they are weakly relevant to our model. For
largest remainders methods, a quota q is computed as a function of the number of seats k and the number of
voters n. The number of votes for party i is ni = n.πi. The most common choice of a quota is the Hare
quota, defined as nk ; the method based on the Hare quota is called the Hamilton method.
3 Our aim is to
generalize the Hamilton method to multiattribute domains.
Definition 4 (The largest remainder method.) The largest remainder method with quota q is defined as
follows:
• for all i, s∗i = niq is the ideal number of seats for party i.
• each party i receives si = ⌊s∗i ⌋ seats; let ti = si − s∗i (called the remainder).
3Other common choices are the Droop quota 1 + n
1+k
, the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota n
1+k
and the Imperiali quota n
2+k
.
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• the remaining k −
∑
i si seats are given to the k −
∑
i si parties with the highest remainders ti.
Below we show that the largest remainder methods select a distribution (k1, . . . , kq) minimizing
maxi=1,...,p(s
∗
i − ki), which in the case of Hamilton comes down to minimizing maxi=1,...,p(niq − ki).
After defining πi1 = nin for all i, we obtain the result that explains that our problem, with any of the three
variants of loss functions, generalizes the Hamilton apportionment method.
Proposition 1 When p = 1 and assuming there are at least k items for each attribute, optimal subsets for
‖ · ‖1, ‖ · ‖1,max and ‖ · ‖max coincide, and correspond to the subsets given by the Hamilton apportionment
method.
Proof. Note that ‖ · ‖1,max and ‖ · ‖max are equivalent for p = 1. Recall that s∗j denotes the target number
of seats for party j. Let A be a committee of size k and let Rj(A) = k rj(A) be the number of members of
A that belong to party j. Since |Rj(A) − s∗j | = k|rj(A) − πj |, we need to show that the following three
assertions are equivalent:
1. A minimizes
∑
j |R
j(A) − s∗j |.
2. A minimizes maxj |Rj(A) − s∗j |.
3. A is a Hamilton committee.
We first show 1⇒ 3. Assume A is not a Hamilton committee: then there exists an attribute value (party) that
receives strictly more or strictly less seats than it would receive according to the Hamilton method. Naturally,
there must also exist an attribute that receives strictly less or strictly more seats, respectively. Formally, this
means that there are two attribute values (parties), say 1 and 2, such that the target number of seats for parties
1 and 2 are s∗1 = p + α1 and s∗2 = q + α2, with p, q integers and 1 > α2 > α1 ≥ 0, and such that either
R1(A) ≥ p + 1 and R2(A) ≤ q. We have
∑
j |R
j(A) − πj | =
∑
j 6=1,2 |R
j(A) − s∗j | + |R
1(A) − s∗1| +
|R2(A) − s∗2| ≥
∑
j 6=1,2 |R
j(A) − s∗j | + (1 − α1) + α2. Consider the committee A′ obtained from A by
giving one less seat to 1 and one more to 2.
• If R1(A) > p + 1 then
∑
j |R
j(A) − s∗j | −
∑
j |R
j(A′) − s∗j | = |R
1(A) − s∗1| − |R
1(A′) − s∗1| +
|R2(A)− s∗2| − |R
2(A′)− s∗2| ≥ 1 + (1− α2)− α2 > 0.
• If R2(A) < q then similarly,
∑
j |R
j(A)− s∗j | −
∑
j |R
j(A′)− s∗j | > 0.
• IfR1(A) = p+1 andR2(A) = q then we have
∑
j |R
j(A)−s∗j | =
∑
j 6=1,2 |R
j(A)−s∗j |+(1−α1)+α2
and
∑
j |R
j(A′)−s∗j | =
∑
j 6=1,2 |R
j(A′)−s∗j |+(1−α2)+α1, hence
∑
j |R
j(A)−s∗j |−
∑
j |R
j(A′)−
s∗j | = 2(α2 − α1) > 0.
In all three cases, A does not minimize
∑
j |R
j(A) − s∗j | and is therefore not an optimal committee for
‖ · ‖1,
∑
.
We now show 2 ⇒ 3. Call a party i lucky if Ri(A) > s∗i and unlucky if Ri(A) < s∗i . Then we
have maxi |Ri(A) − s∗i | = max(0,max{Ri(A) − s∗i |i lucky},max{s∗i − Ri(A)|i unlucky}). Let, without
loss of generality, 1 be the lucky party with the highest value (if there are several such parties, we take
arbitrary one of them) Ri(A) − s∗i and 2 be the unlucky party with the highest value s∗i − Ri(A). Assume
A is not a Hamilton committee: then 2 had a higher remainder than 1 before 1 got her last seat, that is,
R2(A) − s∗2 > (R
1(A) − 1) − s∗1. Let A′ be the committee A′ obtained from A by giving one less seat
to 1 and one more to 2: then either A′ is a Hamilton committee, or it is not, and in this case we repeat the
operation until we get a Hamilton committee A∗. Because maxj |Rj(A∗)− s∗j | < maxj |Rj(A)− s∗j |, A is
not an optimal committee for ‖ · ‖max.
It remains to be shown that if A is a Hamilton committee then if is both optimal for ‖·‖1,max and ‖·‖max.
If there is a unique Hamilton-optimal committee then this follows immediately from 1 ⇒ 3 and 2 ⇒ 3.
Assume there are several Hamilton-optimal committees A1, . . . , Aq . Then there are q parties, w.l.o.g.,
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1, . . . q, with equal remainders α ∈ [0, 1), that is, s∗1 = p1 + α, . . . , s∗q = pq + α, and the Hamilton-optimal
committees differ only in the choice if those of these q parties to give they give an extra seat. We easily check
that for any two A,A′ of these committees we have ‖A‖1,max = ‖A′‖1,max and ‖A‖max = ‖A′‖max. ✷
Therefore, our model can be seen as a generalization of the Hamilton apportionment method to more than
attribute. Note that our model can easily extend other largest remainder methods, and our results would be
easily adapted. Interestingly, when p ≥ 2, our three criteria no longer coincide. However, for binary domains,
‖ · ‖1 and ‖ · ‖1,max coincide, since
∑
j=1,2 |r
j
i (A)− π
j
i | = 2maxj=1,2 |r
j
i (A)− π
j
i |.
Proposition 2
1. For each p ≥ 3 and binary domains, optimal subsets for ‖ · ‖1 and ‖ · ‖max may be disjoint, even for
k = 2.
2. For each p ≥ 3, optimal subsets for ‖ · ‖max and ‖ · ‖1,max can be disjoint.
3. For each p ≥ 2, if at least one attribute has 4 values, then optimal subsets for ‖ · ‖1 and ‖ · ‖1,max can
be disjoint.
4. For p = 2 and binary domains, optimal subsets for ‖ · ‖1 and ‖ · ‖max may differ.
Proof. We prove point 1 for p = 3 (the proof extends easily to p > 3 by adding attributes on which all items,
and the target, agree). We have four candidates: two (A and B) with attribute vectors (x21, x12, x13), and two (C
and D) with (x11, x22, x23). The target distribution is π1i = 0 and π2i = 1 for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The ‖ ·‖max-optimal
committees are {A,C}, {A,D}, {B,C} and {B,D}. The ‖ · ‖1-optimal committee is {C,D}.
For Point 2: because optimal subsets for ‖ · ‖1 and ‖ · ‖1,max coincide for binary domains, Point 1 implies
that optimal subsets for ‖ · ‖max and ‖ · ‖1,max can be disjoint. The counterexample extends easily to non-
binary domains.
For Point 3: Let there be two attributes X1 with values x11, x21, x31, x41 and X2 with values x12, x22; four
candidates: A with value vector (x11, x22), B with value vector (x21, x22), C with value vector (x31, x12), and
D with value vector (x41, x12); k = 2; and π = (0.5, 0.5, 0, 0) for X1 and (0.9, 0.1) for X2. The optimal
committees for ‖ · ‖1 are all pairs except {C,D} (with loss 1.8) while the optimal committee for ‖ · ‖1,max
is {C,D} (with loss 0.6). Next, we show that ‖ · ‖max and ‖ · ‖1,max can be disjoint. The counterexample
extends easily to more attributes and more values.
For Point 4, let k = 2, three candidates A, B and C with value vectors (x11, x12), (x11, x12) and (x21, x22);
and π11 = 1, π21 = 0, π12 = 0, and π22 = 1. {A,B}, {A,C} and {B,C} are all ‖ · ‖1-optimal, but only
{A,C} and {B,C} are ‖ · ‖max-optimal. ✷
These negative results come from the constraints imposed by the candidate database, which prevent the
selection on the different attributes to be done independently. In the example of the proof of point 1, for
instance, since all items with the value x12 for X2 have value x13 for X3, selecting q items with X2 = x12
implies selecting q items with X3 = x13. However, if the database is sufficiently diverse so that no such
constraints exist, the optimization can be done separately on each attribute. This is captured by the following
notion.
Definition 5 A candidate databaseC satisfy the Full Supply (FS) property with respect to k if for any ~x ∈ D
there are at least k candidates in C associated with value vector ~x.
The candidate database of Example 1 does not satisfy FS, even for k = 1, because there is not a single
candidate with group C and age S. If we ignore attributes group and affiliation, then we are left with 2
(resp., 3, 2, 3) candidates with value vector FJ (resp. MJ , FS, MS): the reduced database satisfies FS for
k ∈ {1, 2}.
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Proposition 3 Let (X,C, k) be an optimal committee selection problem. If C satisfies FS w.r.t. k, then the
following statements are equivalent:
• A is an optimal committee for ‖ · ‖1
• A is an optimal committee for ‖ · ‖1,max
• for any attribute Xi, A is a Hamilton committee for the single-attribute problem ({Xi}, D↓Xi , πi, k),
where D↓Xi is the projection of D on {Xi}.
Moreover, any ‖ ·‖1 (and ‖ ·‖1,max) optimal committee is optimal for ‖ ·‖max. (The converse does not always
hold.)
Proof. For each attribute Xi and value xji ∈ Di, let Rji be the number of seats with value xji given
by the Hamilton method for the single-attribute problem ({Xi}, D↓Xi , πi, k). For all j = 1, . . . , k, let
ti(j) = min{l | R
1
i + . . . + R
l−1
i < j and R1i + . . . + Rli ≥ j}. Then take as item cj any item in the
database with value vector (xt1(j)1 , . . . , x
tp(j)
p ), and remove it from the database; the full supply assumption
guarantees that it will always be possible to find such an item. Let A = {c1, . . . , ck}; it is easy to check that
A is an optimal committee for ‖ · ‖1 and for ‖ · ‖1,max. ✷
To illustrate the constructive proof, consider 2 attributesX1 with 3 values x11, x21, x31, andX2 with 2 values
x12, x
2
2; k = 4; and R11 = 2, R21 = 0, R31 = 2, R12 = 3, R22 = 1. Then t1(1) = t1(2) = 1, t1(3) = t1(4) = 3,
t2(1) = t2(2) = t2(3) = 1, t2(4) = 2, which leads to choose c1 with value vector (x11, x12), c2 with vector
(x11, x
1
2), c3 with vector (x31, x12), and c4 with vector (x31, x22).
5 Properties of multi-attribute proportional representation
Several properties of apportionment methods have been studied, starting with Balinski and Young [1]. We
omit their definition in the single-attribute case and directly give their generalizations to our more general
model. LetA be any optimal committee for some criterion given π, C and k. We recall thatRji (A) = k r
j
i (A)
denotes the number of elements of A with the attribute Xi equal to xji .
• Non-reversal: for any attribute Xi, and attribute values xji , x
j′
i , if π
j
i > π
j′
i then r
j
i (A) ≥ r
j′
i (A).
• Exactness and respect of quota: for all i, either Rji = ⌊kπji ⌋ or Rji = ⌈kπji ⌉.
• Population monotonicity (with respect to Xi): consider π and ρ such that (a) πji > ρji , (b) for all
j′, j′′ 6= j,
πj
′′
i
πj
′
i
=
ρj
′′
i
ρj
′
i
, and (c) for all i′ 6= i and all j, ρji′ = πji′ . Then there is an optimal committee B
for ρ such that rji (A) ≥ r
j
i (B).
• House monotonicity: let B be an optimal committee for π, C and k′ > k. Then for all i, j, rji (B) ≥
rji (A).
4
In the single-attribute case, it is known for long that the Hamilton method satisfies all these properties
except house monotonicity (this failure of house monotonicity is better known under the name Alabama
paradox).
We start by noticing that if a property fails to be satisfied in the single-attribute case, a fortiori it is not
satisfied in the multi-attribute case. As a consequence, house monotonicity is not satisfied, even under the FS
assumption. We now consider the other properties.
4Some other properties, such as consistency, seem more difficult to generalize to the multi-attribute case. Also, properties that deal
with strategy proofness issues, such as resistance to party merging or party splitting, are less relevant in our setting than for political
elections and we omit them.
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Proposition 4 Under the full supply assumption, non-reversal, exactness and respect of quota, and popula-
tion monotonicity are all satisfied, for any of our loss functions. In the general case, non-reversal, exactness
and respect of quota are not satisfied. If Xi is a binary variable, and for ‖ · ‖1, population monotonicity with
respect to Xi is satisfied; however it is not satisfied in the general case.
Proof. Under FS, the result easily comes from Proposition 3 and the fact that the property holds in the
single-attribute case.
In the general case, we give counterexamples. For exactness and respect of quota, we have two binary
attributes, and two items a, b with value vectors (x21, x22) and (x11, x12), k = 1, π defined as π11 = 0, π21 = 1,
π12 = 1, π
2
2 = 0. The optimal committee is either {a} or {b}, and does not respect quota even though all
values kπji are integers.
For non-reversal we have two binary attributes and six items: a, b, c, each with vector (x11, x12) and d, e, f ,
each with vector (x21, x22). We have a target distribution π defined as follows: π11 = 0.35, π21 = 0.65, π12 = 1,
π22 = 0. We set k = 3. The optimal committees for ‖ · ‖1 and ‖ · ‖1,max are {a, b, c} and all triples made up
from two items out of {a, b, c} and one out of {d, e, f}. The optimal committees for ‖ · ‖max are all triples
made up from two items out of {a, b, c} and one out of {d, e, f}. In all cases, for all optimal committees A
we have r11(A) > r21(A) although π11 < π21 .
Now, we prove that population monotonicity holds for binary domains and for ‖ · ‖1. Consider a binary
attribute Xi, with Di = {x0i , x1i }.
Assume that ρ0i > π0i (and ρ0i > π0i ), and that for all i′ 6= i we have ρi′ = πi′ . Let A be an optimal
committee for π and, for the sake of contradiction, assume that for all optimal committees B for ρ we
have r0i (B) < r0i (A). Let B be such a committee. The proof is a case by case study, with six cases
to be considered: (C1) r0i (B) ≤ π0i < ρ0i ≤ r0i (A); (C2) π0i ≤ r0i (B) ≤ ρ0i ≤ r0i (A); (C3) π0i <
ρ0i ≤ r
0
i (B) < r
0
i (A); (C4) r0i (B) ≤ π0i ≤ r0i (A) ≤ ρ0i ; (C5) π0i ≤ r0i (B) < r0i (A) ≤ ρ0i ; and (C6)
r0i (B) < r
0
i (A) ≤ π
0
i < ρ
0
i .
• Case 1: r0i (B) ≤ π0i < ρ0i ≤ r0i (A). In this case we have r1i (B) ≥ π1i > ρ1i ≥ r1i (A) and the
following holds:
‖r(B)− π‖1 =
∑
i′ 6=i
∑
j |r
j
i′(B)− π
j
i′ |+ (π
0
i − r
0
i (B)) + (r
1
i (B)− π
1
i ) (1)
=
∑
i′ 6=i
∑
j |r
j
i′(B)− ρ
j
i′ |+ (ρ
0
i − r
0
i (B)) + (r
1
i (B)− ρ
1
i )
+π0i − π
1
i − ρ
0
i + ρ
1
i (2)
= ‖r(B) − ρ‖1 + 2(π
0
i − ρ
0
i ) (3)
< ‖r(A) − ρ‖1 + 2(π
0
i − ρ
0
i ) (4)
=
∑
i′ 6=i
∑
j |r
j
i′(A) − ρ
j
i′ |+ (r
0
i (A) − ρ
0
i ) + (ρ
1
i − r
1
i (A)) + 2(π
0
i − ρ
0
i ) (5)
=
∑
i′ 6=i
∑
j |r
j
i′(A) − ρ
j
i′ |+ (r
0
i (A) − π
0
i ) + (π
1
i − r
1
i (A))
+π0i − π
1
i − ρ
0
i + ρ
1
i + 2(π
0
i − ρ
0
i ) (6)
= ‖r(A) − π‖1 + 4(π
0
i − ρ
0
i ) (7)
≤ ‖r(A) − π‖1 (8)
(4) comes from the fact thatA is not optimal for ρ. Since, there is one strong inequality in the sequence,
we imply that A is not optimal for π, a contradiction.
• Case 2: π0i ≤ r0i (B) ≤ ρ0i ≤ r0i (A).
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‖r(B)− π‖1 =
∑
i′ 6=i
∑
j |r
j
i′(B)− π
j
i′ |+ (r
0
i (B)− π
0
i ) + (π
1
i − r
1
i (B))
=
∑
i′ 6=i
∑
j |r
j
i′(B)− ρ
j
i′ |+ (ρ
0
i − r
0
i (B)) + (r
1
i (B)− ρ
1
i )
+2r0i (B)− π
0
i − ρ
0
i − 2r
1
i (B) + π
1
i + ρ
1
i
= ‖r(B) − ρ‖1 + 4r
0
i (B)− 2π
0
i − 2ρ
0
i
< ‖r(A) − ρ‖1 + 4r
0
i (B)− 2π
0
i − 2ρ
0
i
=
∑
i′ 6=i
∑
j |r
j
i′(A) − ρ
j
i′ |+ (r
0
i (A) − ρ
0
i ) + (ρ
1
i − r
1
i (A)) + 4r
0
i (B)− 2π
0
i − 2ρ
0
i
=
∑
i′ 6=i
∑
j |r
j
i′(A) − ρ
j
i′ |+ (r
0
i (A) − π
0
i ) + (π
1
i − r
1
i (A))
+π0i − ρ
0
i − π
1
i + ρ
1
i + 4r
0
i (B) − 2π
0
i − 2ρ
0
i
= ‖r(A) − π‖1 + 4r
0
i (B)− 4ρ
0
i
≤ ‖r(A) − π‖1
Again we obtain a contradiction.
• Case 3: π0i < ρ0i ≤ r0i (B) < r0i (A).
‖r(B)− π‖1 =
∑
i′ 6=i
∑
j |r
j
i′(B)− π
j
i′ |+ (r
0
i (B)− π
0
i ) + (π
1
i − r
1
i (B))
=
∑
i′ 6=i
∑
j |r
j
i′(B)− ρ
j
i′ |+ (r
0
i (B) − ρ
0
i ) + (ρ
1
i − r
1
i (B))
−π0i + ρ
0
i + π
1
i − ρ
1
i
= ‖r(B) − ρ‖1 − 2π
0
i + 2ρ
0
i
< ‖r(A) − ρ‖1 − 2π
0
i + 2ρ
0
i
=
∑
i′ 6=i
∑
j |r
j
i′(A) − ρ
j
i′ |+ (r
0
i (A) − ρ
0
i ) + (ρ
1
i − r
1
i (A))− 2π
0
i + 2ρ
0
i
=
∑
i′ 6=i
∑
j |r
j
i′(A) − ρ
j
i′ |+ (r
0
i (A) − π
0
i ) + (π
1
i − r
1
i (A))
+π0i − ρ
0
i − π
1
i + ρ
1
i − 2π
0
i + 2ρ
0
i
= ‖r(A) − π‖1
• Case 4: r0i (B) ≤ π0i ≤ r0i (A) ≤ ρ0i .
‖r(B)− π‖1 =
∑
i′ 6=i
∑
j |r
j
i′(B)− π
j
i′ |+ (π
0
i − r
0
i (B)) + (r
1
i (B)− π
1
i )
=
∑
i′ 6=i
∑
j |r
j
i′(B)− ρ
j
i′ |+ (ρ
0
i − r
0
i (B)) + (r
1
i (B)− ρ
1
i )
π0i − ρ
0
i − π
1
i + ρ
1
i
= ‖r(B) − ρ‖1 + 2π
0
i − 2ρ
0
i
< ‖r(A) − ρ‖1 + 2π
0
i − 2ρ
0
i
=
∑
i′ 6=i
∑
j |r
j
i′(A) − ρ
j
i′ |+ (ρ
0
i − r
0
i (A)) + (r
1
i (A)− ρ
1
i ) + 2π
0
i − 2ρ
0
i
=
∑
i′ 6=i
∑
j |r
j
i′(A) − ρ
j
i′ |+ (r
0
i (A) − π
0
i ) + (π
1
i − r
1
i (A))
−2r0i (A) + 2r
1
i (A) + π
0
i + ρ
0
i − π
1
i − ρ
1
i + 2π
0
i − 2ρ
0
i
= ‖r(A) − π‖1 − 4r
0
i (A) + 4π
0
i
≤ ‖r(A) − π‖1
• Case 5: π0i ≤ r0i (B) < r0i (A) ≤ ρ0i .
‖r(B)− π‖1 =
∑
i′ 6=i
∑
j |r
j
i′(B)− π
j
i′ |+ (r
0
i (B)− π
0
i ) + (π
1
i − r
1
i (B))
=
∑
i′ 6=i
∑
j |r
j
i′(B)− ρ
j
i′ |+ (ρ
0
i − r
0
i (B)) + (r
1
i (B)− ρ
1
i )
+2r0i (B)− 2r
1
i (B)− π
0
i − ρ
0
i + π
1
i + ρ
1
i
= ‖r(B) − ρ‖1 + 4r
0
i (B)− 2π
0
i − 2ρ
0
i
< ‖r(A) − ρ‖1 + 4r
0
i (B)− 2π
0
i − 2ρ
0
i
=
∑
i′ 6=i
∑
j |r
j
i′(A) − ρ
j
i′ |+ (ρ
0
i − r
0
i (A)) + (r
1
i (A)− ρ
1
i ) + 4r
0
i (B)− 2π
0
i − 2ρ
0
i
=
∑
i′ 6=i
∑
j |r
j
i′(A) − ρ
j
i′ |+ (r
0
i (A) − π
0
i ) + (π
1
i − r
1
i (A))
+4r0i (B)− 2r
0
i (A) + 2r
1
i (A) + π
0
i + ρ
0
i − π
1
i − ρ
1
i − 2π
0
i − 2ρ
0
i
= ‖r(A) − π‖1 + 4r
0
i (B)− 4r
0
i (A)
≤ ‖r(A) − π‖1
• Case 6: r0i (B) < r0i (A) ≤ π0i < ρ0i .
9
‖r(B)− π‖1 =
∑
i′ 6=i
∑
j |r
j
i′(B)− π
j
i′ |+ (π
0
i − r
0
i (B)) + (r
1
i (B)− π
1
i )
=
∑
i′ 6=i
∑
j |r
j
i′(B)− ρ
j
i′ |+ (ρ
0
i − r
0
i (B)) + (r
1
i (B)− ρ
1
i )
+π0i − ρ
0
i − π
1
i + ρ
1
i
= ‖r(B) − ρ‖1 + 2π
0
i − 2ρ
0
i
< ‖r(A) − ρ‖1 + 2π
0
i − 2ρ
0
i
=
∑
i′ 6=i
∑
j |r
j
i′(A) − ρ
j
i′ |+ (ρ
0
i − r
0
i (A)) + (r
1
i (A)− ρ
1
i ) + 2π
0
i − 2ρ
0
i
=
∑
i′ 6=i
∑
j |r
j
i′(A) − ρ
j
i′ |+ (π
0
i − r
0
i (A)) + (r
1
i (A) − π
1
i )
−π0i + ρ
0
i + π
1
i − ρ
1
i + 2π
0
i − 2ρ
0
i
= ‖r(A) − π‖1
Finally, we give an example showing that population monotonicity does not hold in the general case for ‖ ·‖1.
First, we describe the set of attributes. We have one distinguished attribute X1 with 5 possible values x11,
x21, x
3
1, x
4
1, and x51 and 64 groups of binary attributes, indexed with the pairs of integers i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
These groups of attributes are denoted as X(1,1), X(1,2), . . .X(1,8), X(2,1), . . .X(8,8). Each group contains
some large number λ of indistinguishable attributes, each having the same set of possible values {x12, x22}.
We have 16 alternatives A1, A2, . . . , A8, and B1, B2, . . . B8, and our goal is to select a subset of k = 8 of
them.
We start with describing these alternatives on binary attributes: each alternative Ai has the value x12
on all attributes X(i,·) and the value x22 on all the remaining ones; each alternative Bi has the value x12 on
all attributes X(·,i) and the value x22 on all the remaining ones. For the binary attributes we set the target
probabilities to π12 = 1/8 and π22 = 7/8. Due to this construction, we see that the only two subsets that
perfectly agree with target distributions on each of binary attributes are A = {A1, A2, . . . , A8} and B =
{B1, B2, . . . , B8}. Indeed, every subset S includingAi andBj , would have r(S) ≥ 1/4 at least for one group
of attributes X(i,j). Since λ is large, we infer that, independently what happens on the distinguished attribute
X1, the only possible winning committee is either A = {A1, A2, . . . , A8} or B = {B1, B2, . . . , B8}.
Next, let us describe what happens on the attribute X1. The vector 〈rji (A)〉 is equal to 〈r
j
i (A)〉 =
(1/2, 0, 1/2, 0, 0). For the committee B, we have 〈rji (B)〉 = (1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/8, 1/8), and the vector of
target distributions for X1 is equal π1 = (0, 0, 3/8 + ǫ, 5/8 − ǫ, 0). We can see that ‖r(A) − π‖1 =
1/2+1/8−ǫ+5/8−ǫ = 1.25−2ǫ. Since, ‖r(B)−π‖1 = 1/4+1/4+1/8+ǫ+4/8−ǫ+1/8 = 1.25, we
get that A is a winning committee. However, if we modify the target fractions so that ρ1 = (1/4, 0, 9/32 +
ǫ1, 15/32 − ǫ2, 0), we will get ‖r(A) − ρ‖1 = 1/4 + 7/32 − ǫ1 + 15/32 − ǫ2 = 30/32 − ǫ1 − ǫ2 and
‖r(B) − ρ‖1 = 1/4 + 1/32 + ǫ1 + 11/32− ǫ2 + 1/8 = 24/32 + ǫ1 − ǫ2, thus, B is winning according to
ρ. However, B has lower representation of x11 than A, and ρ was obtained from π, by increasing the fraction
of π11 . This completes the proof.
✷
Other properties, specific to multi-attribute proportional representation, could also be considered, for
instance by adapting properties studied by Elkind et al. [10]. One such property is candidate monotonicity
(if we add more candidates to the database, the new committee must be at least as good as the old one). We
leave this for further research.
6 Computing Optimal Committees
In this section we now investigate the computation complexity of optimal committees. We start with observ-
ing that the problem of deciding whether there is a perfect committee for a given instance is NP-complete.
Proposition 5 Given set of attributes X , a set of candidates C, a vector of target distributions π, an integer
k, deciding whether there is a perfect committee is NP-complete.
Proof. Membership is straightforward. Hardness follows by reduction from the NP-complete problem
EXACT COVER WITH 3-SETS, or X3C [12]. Let I = 〈X,S〉 with X = {x1, . . . , x3k} and S = {S1, . . . , Sn}
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with |Si| = 3 for each i. I is a positive instance of X3C iff there is a collection S ′ ⊆ S with |S ′| = k and
∪{S|S ∈ S ′} = X . Define the following instance of PERFECT COMMITTEE: let X1, . . . , X3k be 3k binary
attributes, and let C consist of m candidates c1, . . . , cm with Xi(cj) = 1 if xi ∈ Sj and Xi(cj) = 0 if
xi /∈ Sj . Finally, for each i, πi(0) = k−1k and πi(1) =
1
k . We want a committee of size k. A = {ci1 , . . . , cik}
is perfect for π if for each Xi, there is exactly one j ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that Xi(cij ) = 1, which is equivalent
to saying that for each xi, there is exactly one Sj ∈ {Si1 , . . . , Sik} such that xi ∈ Sj . Thus, there is a perfect
committee for π and C if and only if I is a positive instance. ✷
This simple result implies that the decision problem associated with finding an optimal committee (is
there a committee whose loss is less than θ?) is NP-hard for all loss functions. However, if the number of
attributes p is fixed, the problem is solvable in polynomial time.
Proposition 6 Let p be a constant integer. Given set of p attributes X , a set of candidates C, a vector of
target distributions π, an integer k, deciding whether there is a perfect committee is solvable in polynomial
time.
Proof. Let q = maxi qi. Each candidate can be viewed as a vector of values indexed with the attributes;
there are qp such possible vectors. Since the size of the input is at least q, the number of distinct candidates
is bounded by the polynomial function of the size of the input. The rest of the proof is the same as the proof
of Theorem 4. ✷
6.1 Approximating optimal committees
A natural approach to alleviate the NP-hardness of the problem is to analyze whether it can be well approx-
imated. Before proceeding to presentation of our approximation algorithms, the core technical contribution
of this paper, we define the notion of approximability used in our analysis.
Definition 6 An algorithm A is an α-additive-approximation algorithm for OPTIMALREPRESENTATION if
for each instance I of OPTIMALREPRESENTATION it holds that |f(π, r(A)) − f(π, r(A∗))| ≤ α, where A
is the committee returned by A for I , and A∗ an optimal committee.
It is easy to observe that for binary domains it holds that ‖π, r(A)‖1 = 2‖π, r(A)‖1,max. This implies
that for binary domains, an α-additive-approximation algorithm for ‖ · ‖1 is an α2 -additive-approximation
algorithm for ‖ · ‖1,max.
In this paper we mostly present computational results for binary domains. However, this assumption is not
as restrictive as it may seem—every instance of the OPTIMALREPRESENTATION problem can be transformed
to a new instance with binary domains in the following way:
• Xnew = {Xij | i = 1, . . . , p, j = 1, . . . , |Di|}.
• Cnew = {c
′
l | l = 1, . . . ,m}.
• πnew = (πi,j | 1 ≤ i ≤ p, 1 ≤ j ≤ |Di|), where for all i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . , p and j = 1, . . . , |Di|,
π0i,j = π
j
i and π1i,j = 1− π
j
i .
The following lemma shows how to obtain approximation guarantees for arbitrary domains having guar-
antees for the problem transformed to binary domains.
Lemma 1 For a given committee A and target distribution π, let Anew and πnew denote the committee and
target distributions obtained as above. The following holds:
1. ‖πnew, r(Anew)‖1 = 2‖π, r(A)‖1.
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2. 1 ≤ ‖πnew,r(Anew)‖1,max‖π,r(A)‖1,max ≤ maxi |Di|.
3. max(πnew, r(Anew)) = max(π, r(A)).
Proof. We prove the first equality—the proof for the other two is similar.
‖π, r(A)‖1 =
∑
i,j
|rji (A)− π
j
i | =
∑
i,j
∣∣∣∣∣
|{c ∈ A : Xi(c) = x
j
i}|
k
− πji
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∑
i,j
∣∣∣∣ |{c ∈ Anew : Xi,j(c) = 1}|k − π1i,j
∣∣∣∣
=
1
2
∑
i,j
(∣∣∣∣ |{c ∈ Anew : Xi,j(c) = 1}|k − π1i,j
∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣ |{c ∈ Anew : Xi,j(c) = 0}|k − π0i,j
∣∣∣∣
)
=
1
2
∑
i,j
∑
ℓ∈{0,1}
|rℓi,j(A)− π
ℓ
i,j | =
1
2
‖πnew, r(Anew)‖1.
✷
Lemma 1 has interesting implications—first shows that the transformed instance has the has the same
perfect committees as the original instance; then it shows how to obtain additive approximation guarantees for
arbitrary domains having guarantees for the problem restricted to binary domains, for different loss functions.
6.2 Approximation algorithms
In this section we show an approximation algorithm for the OPTIMALREPRESENTATION problem. The
algorithm is given in Figure 1 and is parameterized by an integer value ℓ. It starts with a random collection of
k samples and, in each step, it looks whether it is possible to replace some ℓ items from the current solution
with some other ℓ items to obtain a better solution. The algorithm continues until it cannot find any pair of
sets of ℓ items that improves the current solution. As we show now, the approximation guarantees depend on
the value of the parameter ℓ.
Parameters:
π = (π1, . . . , πp)—input target distributions.
ℓ—the parameter of the algorithm.
A← k random items from C;
while there exist Cℓ ⊂ C and Aℓ ⊂ A such that |Cℓ| ≤ ℓ, |Aℓ| ≤ ℓ, and f(π, r(A)) > f(π, r((A \ Aℓ) ∪ Cℓ))
do
A← (A \Aℓ) ∪ Cℓ;
return A;
Figure 1: Local search approximation algorithm.
Theorem 1 For binary domains natural distributions, and for the ‖ · ‖1 loss function, the local search algo-
rithm defined on Figure 1 with ℓ = 1 is a |X |-additive-approximation algorithm for OPTIMALREPRESEN-
TATION.
Proof. LetA∗ denote an optimal solution for a given instance I of the problem of finding a perfect committee.
Let A ∈ Sk(C) denote the set returned by the local search algorithm from Figure 1. From the condition in the
“while” loop, we know that there exist no c ∈ C and a ∈ A such that ‖π, r(A)‖1 > ‖π, r((A\{a})∪{c})‖1.
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Now, let Xex ⊆ X denote the set of all attributes for which A achieves exact match with π, that is, such that
for each Xi ∈ Xex, we have that r1i (A) = π1i and r2i (A) = π2i .
Let us consider the procedure consisting in taking the items from A \ A∗ and, one by one, replace them
with arbitrary items from A∗ \ A. This procedure, in |A \ A∗| steps, transforms A into an optimal solution
A∗. We now estimate the total gain g induced by this procedure. For each item a ∈ A \A∗, by a′ ∈ A∗ \ A
we denote the item which was taken to replace a in the procedure. For each attribute Xi ∈ X we define the
gain gi(a, a′) of replacing a by a′ as:
gi(a, a
′) =
∑
j∈{1,2}
(
|rji (A)− π
j
i | − |r
j
i (A \ {a} ∪ {a
′})− πji |
)
.
We now extend this definition to sets of k candidates:
gi(B,B
′) =
∑
j∈{1,2}
(
|rji (A)− π
j
i | − |r
j
i ((A \ B) ∪ B
′)− πji |
)
.
If Xi ∈ Xex, then ri(A) = πi, and so the replacement cannot improve the quality of the solution relatively
to Xi, hence ∑
i∈Xex
gi(A \A
∗, A∗ \A) ≤ 0. (1)
Note that gi(a, a′) ∈ {− 2k , 0,
2
k}. Moreover, for each attribute Xi /∈ Xex there are two possible cases:
1. rji (A) > π
j
i and each exchange of candidate that results in a negative gain increases r
j
i (A).
2. rji (A) < π
j
i and each exchange that results in a negative gain decreases r
j
i (A).
Intuitively, 1. and 2. mean that for attributes outside of Xex, the negative gains cumulate. Formally, for each
X /∈ Xex:
gi(A \A
∗, A∗ \A) ≤
∑
a∈A\A∗
gi(a, a
′). (2)
From the condition in the “while” loop, we have that for each a ∈ A \A∗:
∑
i gi(a, a
′) ≤ 0, and so:
∑
i
∑
a∈A\A∗
gi(a, a
′) ≤ 0. (3)
We now give the following sequence of inequalities:
g =
∑
i
gi(A \A
∗, A∗ \A)
=
∑
i∈Xex
gi(A \A
∗, A∗ \A) +
∑
i/∈Xex
gi(A \A
∗, A∗ \A)
≤
∑
i/∈Xex
gi(A \A
∗, A∗ \A) ≤
∑
i/∈Xex
∑
a∈A\A∗
gi(a, a
′)
≤ −
∑
i∈Xex
∑
a∈A\A∗
gi(a, a
′)
≤ |Xex| · k ·
2
k
= 2|Xex|. (4)
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Finally, for each attribute Xi ∈ Xex the loss relative to Xi, i.e., |r0i − π0|+ |r1i − π1|, is at most 2. Thus, we
get g ≤ 2(|X | − |Xex|), which leads to g ≤ |X |. ✷
Is the bound |X | from Theorem 1 a good result? One way to interpret this result is to observe that a
solution that for half of the attributes gives exact match, and for other half is arbitrarily bad, is an |X |-
approximate solution. We do not know whether the bound |X | is reached, but we now show that a lower
bound on the error made by the algorithm with ℓ = 1 is 23 |X |.
Example 2 Consider 3p binary attributes X1, . . . , X3p, 4ℓ candidates C = {a1, . . . , a2ℓ, b1, . . . , b2ℓ}, and
let k = 2ℓ. For each i ≤ p, we have: for j ≤ ℓ,Xi(aj) = 1 and Xi(bj) = 1; for j > ℓ,Xi(aj) = 0
and Xi(bj) = 0. For each i such that p < i ≤ 2p we have: for j ≤ ℓ,Xi(aj) = 1 and Xi(bj) = 0; for
j > ℓ,Xi(aj) = 0 andXi(bj) = 1. For i > 2p we have: for each j,Xi(aj) = 1 andXi(bj) = 0. Finally, for
i ≤ 2p let π0i = π1i = 12 , and for i > 2p let π0i = 1−π1i = 1. It can be easily checked thatB = {b1, . . . , b2ℓ}
is a perfect committee. Now, A = {a1, . . . , a2ℓ} is locally optimal. To check this, we consider two cases:
in the first case, where (r ≤ ℓ and q ≤ ℓ) or (r > ℓ and q > ℓ), replacing ar with bq does not change the
distance to the target distribution on each of the first p attributes, increases the distance on each of the next p
attributes and decreases the distance on each of the last p attributes. For the second case, where (r ≤ ℓ and
q > ℓ) or (r > ℓ; q ≤ ℓ), the line of reasoning is similar. Finally, ‖π, r(A)‖1 = 2p = 23 |X |.
A better approximation bound can be obtained with ℓ = 2:
Lemma 2 Consider n buckets X1, . . . , Xn, such that in the i-th bucket Xi there are xi white balls and yi
black balls. Let A denote the number of pairs of balls such that both balls in the pair belong to the same
bucket and are of different color. Let us consider the procedure in which one iteratively selects a bucket and
takes out two balls with different colors from the selected bucket. The procedure ends after B steps, when
no further steps are possible (in each bucket, either there are no balls anymore, or all balls have the same
color). It holds that A ≥ B2n .
Proof. Without loss of generality let us assume that for each i: xi ≤ yi. Thus, B =
∑
i xi and
A =
∑
i xiyi ≤
∑
i x
2
i . The inequality
∑
i x
2
i ≥
(
∑
i
xi)
2
n follows from Jensen’s inequality applied to the
quadratic function. ✷
Lemma 3 Let xi, yi, Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, be real values satisfying the following constraints:
1. xi ≥ Ai2n−2(i−1) , for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
2. Ai ≥ Ai−1 − 2xi−1, for each 2 ≤ i ≤ n,
3. yi ≥ xi2n−2(i−1)−1 , for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Then:
n∑
i=1
yi ≥
|A1| lnn
4n
.
Proof. We can view the set of above inequalities 1, 2, 3 as a linear program with (3n − 1) variables (all xi
and yi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and Ai for 2 ≤ i ≤ q; we treat A1 as a constant) and (3n − 1) constraints. Thus, we
know that
∑
i yi achieves the minimum when each from the above constraints is satisfied with equality.
We show by induction that the values xi = A12n and Ai =
2n−2(i−1)
2n A1 constitute the solution to the set
of equalities that is derived by taking constraints 1, and 2, and treating them as equalities. We can show that
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by induction: It is easy to see that the base step, for i = 1, holds:
x1 =
A1
2n− 2(i− 1)
=
|A1|
2n
,
A1 ≥
2n− 2(1− 1)
2n
A1.
Let us assume that from the equalities 1 and 2 taken for i < j, it follows that xi = A12n andAi =
2n−2(i−1)
2n A1,
for i < j. We will show that from equalities 1 and 2 for i = j it follows that xj = A12n andAj =
2n−2(j−1)
2n A1:
xj =
Aj
2n− 2(j − 1)
=
1
2n− 2(j − 1)
·
2n− 2(j − 1)
2n
A1 =
|A1|
2n
,
Aj = Aj−1 − 2xj−1 =
2n− 2((j − 1)− 1)
2n
A1 − 2
|A1|
2n
=
2n− 2(j − 1)
2n
A1.
From constraint 3, treated as equality, we get:
yi =
xi
2n− 2(i− 1)− 1
=
|A1|
2n(2n− 2(i− 1)− 1)
.
Thus, we infer that
∑n
i=1 yi is minimized when yi =
|A1|
2n(2n−2(i−1)−1) . We recall that Hn denotes the n-th
harmonic number (Hn =
∑n
i=1
1
n ), and that ln(n+ 1) < Hn ≤ 1 + ln(n). As a result we get:
n∑
i=1
yi ≥
A1
2n
n∑
i=1
1
(2n− 2(i− 1)− 1)
≥
A1
2n
n∑
i=1
1
2n− 2(i− 1)
(5)
=
A1
4n
n∑
i=1
1
(n− i+ 1))
=
A1
4n
Hn ≥ A1
lnn
4n
. (6)
✷
Theorem 2 For binary domains (|Di| = 2, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ p), natural distributions, and for ‖ · ‖1
loss function, the local search algorithm from Figure 1 with ℓ = 2 is a ln(k/2)2 ln(k/2)−1
(
|X |+ 6|X|k
)
-additive-
approximation algorithm for OPTIMALREPRESENTATION.
Proof. In this proof we use similar idea to the proof of Theorem 1, but the proof is technically more involved.
As before, byA∗ andAwe denote the optimal solution and the solution returned by the local search algorithm,
respectively. Similarly to the previous proof, by Xex ⊂ X we denote the set of all attributes for which A
achieves exact match with π, i.e.,
Xex =
{
Xi ∈ X : r
1
i (A) = π
1
i
}
.
We also define the set Xaex ⊂ X of all attributes for which A achieves almost exact match with π, i.e.,
Xaex =
{
Xi ∈ X : |r
1
i (A)− π
1
i | ≤
1
k
}
.
Let qf = |A\A
∗|
2 and q = ⌊qf⌋. Let us rename the items from A \ A
∗ so that A \ A∗ = {a1, a2, . . . , a2qf },
and the items from A∗ \ A, so that A∗ \ A = {a′1, a′2, . . . , a′2qf }. Hereinafter, we follow a convention in
which the elements from A∗ \ A are marked with primes. Renaming of the items that we described above,
allows us to the define the following sequence of pairs (a1, a′1), . . . , (a2qf , a′2qf ) in which each element from
A \A∗ is paired with (assigned to) exactly one element from A∗ \A.
For each pair (aj , a′j) and for each attribute Xi we consider what happens if we replace ai in A \A∗ with
a′i. One of three scenarios can happen, after such replacement:
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1. The value r0i (A) can increase by 1k (in such case r1i (A) decreases by 1k ), which we denote by
Xi(aj ↔ a
′
j) = 1,
2. The value r0i (A) can decrease by 1k (in such case r1i (A) increases by 1k ), which we denote by
Xi(aj ↔ a
′
j) = −1, or
3. The value r0i (A) can remain unchanged (in such case r1i (A) also remains unchanged), which we denote
by Xi(aj ↔ a′j) = 0.
We follow a procedure which, in q consecutive steps, replaces pairs of items from A \A∗, with the pairs
of items from A∗ \ A. A pair (ai, aj) is always replaced with (a′i, a′j). In other words, when looking for a
pair from A∗ \A to replace (ai, aj) we follow the assignment rule induced by renaming, as described above.
The way in which we create pairs within A \ A∗ for replacement (the way how (ai, aj) is selected in each
of q consecutive steps) will be described later. After this whole procedureA can differ from A∗ with at most
one element, hence, having distance to the optimal distribution at most equal to |X | 2k . Let us define the
sequence of sets A¯1, A¯2, . . . , A¯q in the following way: we define A¯1 = A \ A∗, and we define A¯j+1 as A¯j
after removing the pair from A \A∗ that was used in replacement in the j-th step of our procedure.
As before, for each B ⊆ A \ A∗ and B′ ⊆ A∗ \ A, and for each attribute Xi ∈ X we define the gain
gi(B,B
′):
gi(B,B
′) =
∑
j∈{1,2}
(
|rji (A)− π
j
i | − |r
j
i ((A \B) ∪B
′)− πji |
)
.
Similarly as in the proof of Theorem 1, we observe that for Xi /∈ Xaex the negative gains cumulate: i.e.,
that for each sequences of disjoint sets B1, B2, . . . , Bs and B′1, B′2, . . . , B′s such that for every 1 ≤ j ≤ s,
Bj ⊆ A \A
∗
, B′j ⊆ A
∗ \A, and |Bj | = |B′j | ≤ 2 we have that:
gi(
⋃
j
Bj ,
⋃
j
B′j) ≤
∑
j
gi(Bj , B
′
j). (7)
Why is this the case? If Xi /∈ Xaex, then the distance between A and the target distribution on attribute
Xi is at least equal to 2 · 2k . In other words: |r
0
i (A) − π
0
i | ≥
2
k and |r
1
i (A) − π
1
i | ≥
2
k . Without loss of
generality let us assume that r0i (A) − π0i ≥ 2k . Since each set Bj and each set B
′
j has at most two elements,
replacing Bj with B′j can change the distance between A and the target distribution, for each attribute, by at
most 2k . Consequently, if gi(Bj , B
′
j) is negative, then it means that replacingBj withB′j makes the difference
r0i (A)−π
0
i even greater. Thus, each such replacement with the negative gain g causes A to move further from
the target distribution by the value g. Naturally, each replacement with the positive gain g causes A to move
closer to the target distribution by at most g. Consequently, after the sequence of replacement ∪jBj ↔ B′j
the distance on the attribute Xi cannot improve by more than
∑
j gi(Bj , B
′
j).
In contrast to the proof of Theorem 1, we note that here we require thatXi /∈ Xaex instead of Xi /∈ Xex—
the above observation is not valid if Xi ∈ Xaex even if Xi /∈ Xex.5
Next, for each A¯j , and each attribute Xi ∈ Xex, we define a set Wj of annihilating pairs as:
Wj(Xi) =
{
((ax, Xi), (ay, Xi)) : ax ∈ A¯j ; ay ∈ A¯j ;x < y;Xi(ax ↔ a
′
x) = −Xi(ay ↔ a
′
y)
}
.
5 Consider an example in which pi1i =
1
k
and r1i (A) =
2
k
. Let us consider sets B = {b1, b2}, B′ = {b′1, b′2}, C = {c1, c2}, C′ =
{c′1, c
′
2} such that: Xi(c1) = Xi(c2) = Xi(b′1) = Xi(b′2) = d1i , and Xi(c′1) = Xi(c′2) = Xi(b1) = Xi(b2) = d2i , Thus, we
have that:
• Replacing B with B′ results with r1i (A) =
4
k
.
• Replacing C with C′ results with r1i (A) = 0.
• Replacing B ∪C with B′ ∪ C′ results with r1i (A) =
2
k
.
We can repeat this reasoning for r2i (A), thus having, gi(B,B′) = −
4
k
, gi(C,C′) = 0 and gi(B ∪ C,B′ ∪ C′) = 0.
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Xi = X1 Xi = X2 Xi = X3 Xi = X4 Xi = X5 Xi = X6 Xi = X7
Xi(a1 ↔ a
′
1) 1 1 1 1 0 0 -1
Xi(a2 ↔ a
′
2) -1 -1 1 0 0 1 0
Xi(a3 ↔ a
′
3) 0 -1 -1 0 1 0 1
Xi(a4 ↔ a
′
4) -1 1 -1 -1 1 0 -1
Table 1: An example illustrating the concept of anichilating pairs. In this example we have Xex =
{X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7} and A¯1 = {a1, a2, a3, a4}. We recall that Xi(ai ↔ a′i) = 1 if replacing
ai with a′i moves A further from the target distribution in one direction and Xi(ai ↔ a′i) = −1 if replacing
ai with a′i moves A further from the target distribution in the other direction. Here, we have W1(X1) =
{
(
(a1, X1), (a2, X1)
)
,
(
(a1, X1), (a4, X1)
)
}, W1(X2) = {
(
(a1, X2), (a2, X2)
)
,
(
(a1, X2), (a3, X2)
)
},
W1(X3) = {
(
(a1, X3), (a3, X3)
)
,
(
(a1, X3), (a4, X3)
)
,
(
(a2, X3), (a3, X3)
)
,
(
(a2, X3), (a4, X3)
)
}, etc.
Further, W1 = W1(X1) ∪ W1(X2) ∪ W1(X3) ∪ W1(X4) ∪ W1(X5) ∪ W1(X6) ∪ W1(X7). There
are many choices for the set P , but it must hold that |P | = 6; we give the following ex-
ample: P = {
(
(a1, X1), (a2, X1)
)
,
(
(a1, X2), (a2, X2)
)
,
(
(a1, X3), (a3, X3)
)
,
(
(a2, X3), (a4, X3)
)
,(
(a1, X4), (a4, X4)
)
,
(
(a1, X7), (a3, X7)
)
}.
Intuitively, if ((ax, Xi), (ay, Xi)) ∈ Wj , then both replacing ax with a′x and replacing ay with a′y move the
original set A (i.e., the set before any of the replacements) further from the target distribution for the attribute
Xi, but replacing {ax, ay} with {a′x, a′y} does not change the distance of A from the target distribution for
the attribute Xi.
For each j, we set Wj = ∪i∈XexWj(Xi). Let us denote by P the number of annihilated pairs of candi-
dates considered in the process of replacing items from A \ A∗ with items from A∗ \ A. Formally, P is the
size of the maximal subset W ⊆W1 composed of disjoint annihilating pairs, i.e., for each i ≤ p, for each ax,
and for each ay, if ((ax, Xi), (ay , Xi)) ∈ P then there exists no b 6= ay such that ((ax, Xi), (b,Xi)) ∈ P
or ((b,Xi), (ax, Xi)) ∈ P . From Lemma 2, after defining each bucket Xi as containing xi white balls and
yi black balls, where xi (respectively, yi) is the number of candidates aj ∈ A¯1 with the value Xi(aj ↔ a′j)
equal to 1 (respectively, -1), it follows that W1 ≥ P 2|Xex| . The concept of annihilating pairs is explained on
example in Table 1.
We are now ready to describe the way in which we select pairs from A \ A∗ in our procedure. In
each step j, the pair (aj,1, aj,2) from A \ A∗ is selected in the following way. For each item a let sj,1(a)
be the number of pairs p in Wj such that p = ((a, ·), (·, ·)) or p = ((·, ·), (a, ·)), let aj,1 be such that
sj,1(aj) = maxa∈A¯j sj,1(a), and let sj,1 = sj,1(aj). Next, for each item b let sj,2(b) be the number of pairs
p inWj such that p = ((aj,1, ·), (b, ·)) or p = ((b, ·), (aj,1, ·)), let aj,2 be such that sj,2(b) = maxb∈A¯j sj,2(b),
and let sj,2 = sj,2(aj,2).
Let us consider the procedure described above on the example from Table 1. The item a1 belongs to 8
pairs in W1 (a1 belongs to 2 pairs for attribute X1, X2, and X3, and to one pair for attributes X4 and X7),
thus: s1,1(a1) = 8. Moreover, s1,1(a2) = 5, s1,1(a3) = 6, and s1,1(a4) = 7. Consequently, a1 will be the
item that will replaced with a′1 in the first step: aj,1 = a1 and sj,1 = 8. Further, s1,2(a2) = 2 (there are
two annihilating pairs including a1 and a2, i.e.,:
(
(a1, X1), (a2, X1)
)
and
(
(a1, X2), (a2, X2)
)); similarly:
s1,2(a3) = 3, and s1,2(a4) = 3. Thus, an arbitrary of the two items, a3 and a4, say a3, will be the second
item that will be replaced with a′3 in the first step. In the second step only two items, a2 and a4, are left, so
both will be replaced with a′2 and a′4 in the second step. Nevertheless, let us illustrate our definitions also
in the second step of the replacement procedure. The set A¯2 consists of two remaining items: a2 and a4.
We have W2 = {
(
(a2, X2), (a4, X2)
)
,
(
(a2, X3), (a4, X3)
)
}. Naturally, s2,1(a2) = s2,1(a4) = s2,2(a2) =
s2,2(a4) = 2.
We want now to derive bounds on the values sj,1 and sj,2. The following inequalities hold:
1. sj,1 ≥ 2|Wj |2qf−2(j−1) for each 1 ≤ j ≤ q.
Wj contains pairs of items belonging to A¯j . A¯1 has 2qf items, and A¯j+1 is obtained from A¯j by
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b b b
Xi(a1 ↔ a
′
1) = 1
Xi(a2 ↔ a
′
2) = −1
Xi(a1 ↔ a
′
1) = 1
Xi(a2 ↔ a
′
2) = 1 Xi(a2 ↔ a
′
2) = 0
Xi(a1 ↔ a
′
1) = 1
a) b) c)
Figure 2: Figure illustrating that for Xi ∈ Xex, gi({a1, a2}, {a′1, a′2}) is greater than (gi(a1, a′1) +
gi(a2, a
′
2)) if and only if ((a1, Xi), (a2, Xi)) is an annihilating pair. The figure presents 3 scenar-
ios: a) ((a1, Xi), (a2, Xi)) is an annihilating pair. Both replacing a1 with a′1 and replacing a2 with
a′2 moves us further from the target distribution for attribute Xi (the target distribution is marked as
a black dot), thus gi(a1, a′1) = − 2k and gi(a2, a′2) = − 2k . However these changes annihilate, and
gi({a1, a2}, {a
′
1, a
′
2}) = 0. b) gi(a1, a′1) = − 2k and gi(a2, a′2) = − 2k , but these changes do not an-
nihilate, and thus: gi({a1, a2}, {a′1, a′2}) = − 4k . c) gi(a1, a′1) = − 2k and gi(a2, a′2) = 0, if at least
one change does not move the solution against the target distribution, the changes do not annihilate, and
gi({a1, a2}, {a
′
1, a
′
2}) = gi(a1, a
′
1) + gi(a2, a
′
2).
removing two items. Consequently, A¯j has 2qf − 2(j − 1) items, and thus, Wj contains pairs of
2qf − 2(j − 1) different items. From the pigeonhole principle it follows that there exists an item that
belongs to at least 2|Wj |2qf−2(j−1) pairs. Naturally, we also get the weaker constraint: sj,1 ≥
|Wj |
2qf−2(j−1)
.
2. |Wj | ≥ |Wj−1| − 2sj−1,1 for each 2 ≤ j ≤ q.
Each item in Wj−1 belongs to at most sj−1,1 pairs (this follows from the definition of sj−1,1). Wj
contains all pairs that Wj−1 contained, except for the pairs involving aj−1,1, aj−2,2 (to obtain A¯j , we
removed these two items from A¯j−1). Consequently, Wj is obtained from Wj−1 by removing at most
2sj−1,1 pairs of items.
3. sj,2 ≥ sj,12qf−2(j−1)−1 for each 1 ≤ j ≤ q.
In Wj , there are sj,1 pairs of items involving aj,1. As we noted before, Wj contains pairs of 2qf −
2(j − 1) different items. Thus, in Wj , aj,1 is paired with at most 2qf − 2(j − 1)− 1 items. From the
pigeonhole principle it follows that aj,1 must be paired with some item at least sj,12qf−2(j−1)−1 times.
From Lemma 3 we get that:
q∑
j=1
sj,2 ≥
|W1| ln q
4q
. (8)
Before we proceed further let us make three observations regarding annihilating pairs. First, we note that
for each Xi ∈ Xex, and each ax and ay , if the value gi({ax, ay}, {a′x, a′y}) is different from (gi(ax, a′x) +
gi(ay, a
′
y)) than it is greater from (gi(ax, a′x) + gi(ay, a′y)) by 4k . We also note that gi({ax, ay}, {a
′
x, a
′
y}) is
greater than (gi(ax, a′x) + gi(ay, a′y)) if and only if the changes Xi(ax ↔ a′x) and Xi(ay ↔ a′y) annihilate
(this is illustrated in Figure 2). Further, we recall that the value sj,2 counts all attributes for which aj,1 and
aj,2 constitute an annihilating pair. Thus, for each 1 ≤ j ≤ q::
∑
i∈Xex
gi({aj,1, aj,2}, {a
′
j,1, a
′
j,2}) =
∑
i∈Xex
(
gi(aj,1, a
′
j,1) + gi(aj,2, a
′
j,2)
)
+ sj,2
4
k
(9)
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b−gi(A \A
∗, A∗ \A)
4 pairs that annihilated
Figure 3: Figure illustrating the effect of replacing 10 items for an attribute Xi ∈ Xex. Each replacement
imposes a negative gain: gi(aj , a′j) = − 2k for 1 ≤ j ≤ 10. Thus,
∑
a∈A\A∗ gi(a, a
′) = − 20k . In this example
four pairs annihilated, and, consequently, gi(A \A∗, A∗ \A) = − 4k .
Our second observation is similar in spirit to the first one. We note that for each Xi ∈ Xex:
gi(A \A
∗, A∗ \A)−
∑
a∈A\A∗
gi(a, a
′) = the number of pairs that annihilated for Xi ×
4
k
.
The above equality is illustrated in Figure 3. As a consequence, we get that:
∑
Xi∈Xex
(
gi(A \A
∗, A∗ \A)−
∑
a∈A\A∗
gi(a, a
′)
)
= the number of pairs that annihilated × 4
k
.
We recall that after the replacement procedureA can differ from A∗ with at most one element, hence, having
distance to the optimal distribution at most equal to |X | 2k . Thus:
∑
Xi∈Xex
(
gi(A \A
∗, A∗ \A)−
q∑
j=1
(
gi(aj,1, a
′
j,1) + gi(aj,2, a
′
j,2)
) )
≤ P ·
4
k
+ |X |
2
k
. (10)
Our third observation says that:
∑
Xi∈Xaex\Xex
gi(A \A
∗, A∗ \A)−
∑
Xi∈Xaex\Xex
q∑
j=1
gi({aj,1, aj,2}, {a
′
j,1, a
′
j,2}) ≤ |Xaex \Xex| . (11)
Where does Inequality 11 come from? Let us use the geometric interpretation, like the one from Fig-
ure 3. Let us consider an Xi, Xi ∈ Xaex. For Xi, A lies in a distance of 2k on the left or on the
right from the target distribution. Without loss of generality, let us assume it lies on the right. Now, if
gi({aj,1, aj,2}, {a
′
j,1, a
′
j,2}) < 0 then replacing (aj,1, aj,2) with (a′j,1, a′j,2) moves the current solution right.
If gi({aj,1, aj,2}, {a′j,1, a′j,2}) = 2k , then replacing (aj,1, aj,2) with (a
′
j,1, a
′
j,2) moves the current solution
by 2k on left. If gi({aj,1, aj,2}, {a
′
j,1, a
′
j,2}) = 0, then replacing (aj,1, aj,2) with (a′j,1, a′j,2) either does not
move the solution or moves it by 4k on left.
Let us define yi = gi(A\A∗, A∗ \A)−
∑q
j=1 gi({aj,1, aj,2}, {a
′
j,1, a
′
j,2}). If the solution moves q times
to the right, then the total gain −
∑q
j=1 gi({aj,1, aj,2}, {a
′
j,1, a
′
j,2}) will be maximized, achieving q 4k . In
such case however, the value gi(A \A∗, A∗ \A) will be equal to −q 4k , and thus the value yi will be equal to
0. After some consideration, the reader will see that the value yi is maximized if the current solution moves
q
2 times right and
q
2 times left, each time by the value of
4
k . This way, the moves to the right induce the total
gain of q2 ·
4
k , the moves to the left induce the zero gain, but as a consequence, the current solution for Xi
does not change (gi(A \ A∗, A∗ \ A) = 0). Thus, for each Xi ∈ Xaex, yi is upper bounded by q2 · 4k ≤ 1,
which proves Inequality 11.
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We can further proceed with the proof by observing that from the condition in the “while” loop we get
that for each 1 ≤ j ≤ q:
0 ≥
∑
i
gi({aj,1, aj,2}, {a
′
j,1, a
′
j,2})
≥
∑
i∈Xex
gi({aj,1, aj,2}, {a
′
j,1, a
′
j,2}) +
∑
i/∈Xex
gi({aj,1, aj,2}, {a
′
j,1, a
′
j,2})
From Equality 9:
≥
∑
i∈Xex
(
gi(aj,1, a
′
j,1) + gi(aj,2, a
′
j,2)
)
+ sj,2
4
k
+
∑
i/∈Xex
gi({aj,1, aj,2}, {a
′
j,1, a
′
j,2}).
Thus, we get:
−
∑
i∈Xex
(
gi(aj,1, a
′
j,1) + gi(aj,2, a
′
j,2)
)
−
4
k
s2j > +
∑
i/∈Xex
gi({aj,1, aj,2}, {a
′
j,1, a
′
j,2}). (12)
Next, we give the following sequence of inequalities:
g =
∑
i
gi(A \A
∗, A∗ \A)
=
∑
Xi∈Xex
gi(A \A
∗, A∗ \A) +
∑
Xi∈Xaex\Xex
gi(A \A
∗, A∗ \A) +
∑
Xi /∈Xaex
gi(A \A
∗, A∗ \A)
From Inequality 7, for all i /∈ Xaex, we have gi(A \ A∗, A∗ \ A) ≤
∑
a∈A\A∗ gi(a, a
′). Since the set
A \ A∗ and
⋃q
j=1{aj,1, aj,2} can differ by at most one item (which induces distance 2|X|k to the optimal
solution), we have that
∑
Xi /∈Xaex
gi(A \A
∗, A∗ \A) ≤
∑
Xi /∈Xaex
q∑
j=1
gi({aj,1, aj,2}, {a
′
j,1, a
′
j,2}) +
2|X |
k
.
And, as a consequence:
g ≤
∑
Xi∈Xex
gi(A \A
∗, A∗ \A) +
∑
Xi∈Xaex\Xex
gi(A \A
∗, A∗ \A)
+
∑
Xi /∈Xaex
q∑
j=1
gi({aj,1, aj,2}, {a
′
j,1, a
′
j,2}) +
2|X |
k
≤
∑
Xi∈Xex
gi(A \A
∗, A∗ \A) +
∑
Xi∈Xaex\Xex
gi(A \A
∗, A∗ \A)
+
∑
Xi /∈Xex
q∑
j=1
gi({aj,1, aj,2}, {a
′
j,1, a
′
j,2})−
∑
Xi∈Xaex\Xex
q∑
j=1
gi({aj,1, aj,2}, {a
′
j,1, a
′
j,2}) +
2|X |
k
.
From Inequality 11 we get:
g ≤
∑
Xi∈Xex
gi(A \A
∗, A∗ \A) +
∑
Xi /∈Xex
q∑
j=1
gi({aj,1, aj,2}, {a
′
j,1, a
′
j,2}) +
2|X |
k
+ |Xaex \Xex| .
From Inequality 12:
g ≤
2|X |
k
+ |Xaex \Xex|+
∑
Xi∈Xex
gi(A \A
∗, A∗ \A)−
∑
Xi∈Xex
q∑
j=1
(
gi(aj,1, a
′
j,1) + gi(aj,2, a
′
j,2)
)
−
4
k
∑
j
sj,2.
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From Inequality 8:
g ≤
2|X |
k
+ |Xaex \Xex| −
|W1| ln q
4q
·
4
k
+
∑
i∈Xex

gi(A \A∗, A∗ \A)−
q∑
j=1
(
gi(aj,1, a
′
j,1) + gi(aj,2, a
′
j,2)
)
From Inequality 10:
g ≤
4|X |
k
+ |Xaex \Xex| −
|W1| ln q
kq
+ P
4
k
.
As we noted before, from Lemma 2, we have that W1 ≥ P
2
|Xex|
. Thus:
g ≤
4|X |
k
+ |Xaex \Xex|+
4
k
(
P −
P 2 ln q
4|Xex|q
)
.
Since q ≤ k2 , and since the function
ln x
x is decreasing for x ≥ 1:
g ≤
4|X |
k
+ |Xaex \Xex|+
4
k
(
P −
P 2 ln(k/2)
2|Xex|k
)
The function f(P ) = P − P
2 ln(k/2)
2|Xex|k
takes its maximum for P = |Xex|kln(k/2) . Thus:
g ≤
4|X |
k
+ |Xaex \Xex|+
4
k
·
|Xex|k
2 ln(k/2)
=
4|X |
k
+ |Xaex \Xex|+
2|Xex|
ln(k/2)
.
Since our local-search algorithm for ℓ = 2 also tries to perform local swaps on single items, we can repeat
the analysis from the proof of Theorem 1. Thus, using Inequality 4 from there, we get that g ≤ 2|Xex|, and
as a consequence:
(
1
2 −
1
ln(k/2)
)
g ≤ |Xex| −
2|Xex|
ln(k/2) .
For each attribute Xi ∈ X \Xaex the distance from A and the target distribution is bounded by 2. For
Xi ∈ Xaex this distance is bounded by 2k . Thus, we get that g ≤ 2(|X |− |Xex| − |Xaex \Xex|) + |X |
2
k , and
so:
g +
(
1
2
−
1
ln(k/2)
)
g +
1
2
g ≤
4|X |
k
+ |Xaex \Xex|+
2|Xex|
ln(k/2)
+ |Xex| −
2Xex|
ln(k/2)
+ (|X | − |Xex| − |Xaex \Xex|) + |X |
2
k
= |X |+
6|X |
k
Finally, we get:
g ≤
ln(k/2)
2 ln(k/2)− 1
(
|X |+
6|X |
k
)
.
Which proves the thesis. ✷
Since a brute-force algorithm can be used to compute an optimal solution for small values of k, Theorem 2
implies that for every ǫ > 0 we can achieve an additive approximation of 12 (|X |+ ǫ), that is we can guarantee
that the solution returned by our algorithm will be at least 4 times better than a solution that is arbitrarily
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bad on each attribute. A natural open question is whether the local search algorithm achieves even better
approximation guarantees for larger values of ℓ.
One may argue that the restriction to normal target distributions is a strong one. However, for a given
vector of target distributions π, we can easily find a vector πN of target normal distributions such that
‖π, πN‖1 ≤
2X
k . Thus, the results from Theorems 1 and 2 can be modified by providing approximation
ratio worse by an additive value of 2Xk but valid for arbitrary target distributions. Again, since an optimal
solution can easily be computed for small values of k, we can get arbitrarily close to the approximation
guarantees given by Theorems 1 and 2, even for non-normal target distributions.
Below we show a lower bound of 2X7 for the approximation ratio of the local search algorithm from
Figure 1 with ℓ = 2.
Example 3 Consider 5p binary attributes X1, . . . , X5p, 6ℓ and the set of distinct candidates C =
{a1, . . . , aℓ, a
′
1, . . . , a
′
ℓ, b1, . . . , bℓ, b
′
1, . . . , b
′
ℓ, c1, . . . , cℓ, c
′
1, . . . , c
′
ℓ} (in our database there exists a large
number p of copies of each candidate from C). For each i, we have:
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7
ai 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
a′i 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
bi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b′i 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
ci 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
c′i 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
We note that for each candidate the value of the attribute X3 is the same as of X4 and the value of the
attribute X5 is the same as of X6. For i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} let π0i = π1i = 12 , and let π07 = 1− π1i = 1.
Let k = 4p. It can be easily checked that the set consisting of p copies of candidates bi, b′i, ci, c′i is a
perfect committee. On the other hand, the set A consisting of 2p copies of candidates ai and a′i is locally
optimal. Indeed, replacing candidate ai or a′i with bi or b′i moves the solution closer to the target distribution
on X7, but the further from the target distribution on X1 or X2. The same situation happens if we replace
candidates ai or a′i with ci or c′i. If we replace two a-candidates with the pair consisting of one b-candidate
(bi or b′i) and one c-candidate (ci or c′i), then such replacement will move the solution closer by 4k to the
target distribution on X7, but will move the solution further by 2k on two attributes from {X3, X4, X5, X6}.
Finally, ‖π, r(A)‖1 = 2p = 27 |X |.
6.3 Parameterized Complexity
In this section, we study the parameterized complexity of the problem of finding a perfect committee. We
are specifically interested whether for some natural parameters there exist fixed parameter tractable (FPT)
algorithms. We recall that the problem is FPT for a parameter P if its each instance I can be solved in time
O(f(P ) · poly(|I|)).
From the point of view of parameterized complexity, FPT is seen as the class of easy problems. There is
also a whole hierarchy of hardness classes, FPT ⊆ W [1] ⊆ W [2] ⊆ · · · (for details, we point the reader to
appropriate overviews [9, 19, 11].
Obviously, the problem admits an FPT algorithm for the parameter m. Now, we present a negative result
for parameter k (committee size) and a positive result for the parameter p (number of attributes).
Theorem 3 The problem of deciding whether there exists a perfect committee is W[1]-hard for the parameter
k, even for binary domains.
Proof. By reduction from the W[1]-complete PERFECTCODE problem [5]. Let I be an instance of
PERFECTCODE that consists of a graph G = (V,E) and a positive integer k. We ask whether there exists
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V ′ ⊆ V such that each vertex in V is adjacent to exactly one vertex from V ′ (by convention, a vertex is
adjacent to itself). From I we construct the following instance I ′ of the perfect committee problem. For each
v ∈ V there is a binary attribute Xv and a candidate cv. For each u, v ∈ V , Xv(cu) = 1 if and only if u and
v are adjacent in G. We look for a committee of size k. For each v, π1v = 1 − π0v = 1k . It is easy to see that
perfect codes in I correspond to perfect committees in I ′. ✷
Theorem 4 For binary domains, there is an FPT algorithm for the perfect committee problem for parameter
p.
Proof. Each item can be viewed as a vector of values indexed with the attributes; there are 2p such possible
vectors: v1, . . . , v2p . For each vi, let ai denote the number of items that correspond to vi. Consider the
following integer linear program, in which each variable bi is the number of candidates corresponding to vi
in a perfect committee.
minimize
2p∑
i=1
bi
subject to:
(a) : bi ≥ 0 1 ≤ i ≤ 2p
(b) : bi ≤ ai 1 ≤ i ≤ 2p
(c) :
2p∑
i=1
bi = k
(d) :
∑
i:vi[j]=1
bi = π
1
i 1 ≤ j ≤ p
This linear program has 2p variables, thus, by the result of Lenstra [15, Section 5] it can be solved in
FPT time for parameter p. This completes the proof. ✷
Example 4 Let p = 2, k = 5, and let the candidate database C consists of 4 candidates with value vector
v1 = (0, 0), 2 with value vector v2 = (1, 0), 2 candidates with value vector v3 = (0, 1) and 2 candidates
with value vector v4 = (1, 1). Let π = ((0.2, 0.8), (0.6, 0.4)). The integer linear program is
minimize b1 + b2 + b3 + b4
subject to:
(a) : bi ≥ 0 1 ≤ i ≤ 4
(b) : b1 ≤ 4; b2 ≤ 2; b3 ≤ 2; b4 ≤ 2
(c) : b1 + b2 + b3 + b4 = 5
(d) : b1 + b3 = 1; b1 + b2 = 3
and a solution is (b1 = 1, b2 = 2, b3 = 0, b4 = 2): a perfect committee is obtained by taking one candidate
with value vector (0, 0), two candidates with value vector (1, 0), and two with value vector (1, 1).
Now, consider the databaseC′ consists of 5 candidates with value vector v1 = (0, 0), 2 with value vector
v2 = (1, 0), 2 candidates with value vector v3 = (0, 1) and 1 candidate with value vector v4 = (1, 1).
Let π = ((0.2, 0.8), (0.6, 0.4)): then the corresponding constraints are inconsistent and there is no perfect
committee.
We conclude this Section by a short discussion. Finding an optimal committee is likely to be difficult if
the candidate database C is large, and the number of attributes not small. Assume |C| is large compared to
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the size of the domain
∏p
i=1 |Di|, that each attribute value appears often enough in C and that there is no
strong correlation between attributes in C: then, the larger |C|, the more likely C satisfies Full Supply, in
which case finding an optimal committee is easy. The really difficult cases are when |C| is not significantly
larger than the domain, or when C shows a high correlation between attributes.
7 Conclusion
We have defined, and studied, multi-attribute generalizations of a well-known apportionment method (Hamil-
ton), albeit with motivations that go far beyond party-list elections (such as the selection of a common set of
items). We have shown positive and negative results concerning the properties satisfied by these generaliza-
tions and their computation, but a lot remains to be done. Note that other largest remainder apportionment
methods can be generalized in a similar way, but it is unclear how largest-average methods can be generalized.
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